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If T IS ALWAYS A PRIVILEGE to be asked to contribute a chapter to a collec-lL tion of essays in honour of a colleague, but in this case it is also a great plea-
sure. The present writer is one of many who have benefited over the years from 
Leslie Green's writings, teaching, friendship, and encouragement. Leslie's con-
tributions to the literature on the laws of war have always combined rigorous 
scholarship with a determination that the subject is a practical one to be ap-
proached in a practical way. It is in that spirit that he has grappled with every 
challenge to that body oflaw, from the Indian National Army trials in which he 
took part at the end of the Second World War to the Kosovo crisis. It therefore 
seems fitting to take the opportunity of this collection of essays to examine the 
impact of the law on military operations and to take stock of where we are going 
at the start of a new millennium. 
The idea oflaws of war is not, of course, a new one. Laws on the conduct of 
hostilities can be traced back several centuries, while rules of international law 
restricting the right to resort to force have existed for most of the present cen-
tury. It is one of the paradoxes of international law that it thus has one body of 
law designed to prevent war, by restricting the circumstances in which it is 
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lawful for States to resort to force, and another designed to regulate the con, 
duct of war if the first is disregarded. While other areas of international law may 
have a bearing on government decisions regarding the use of force, 1 it is these 
two bodies of law on which this paper will accordingly focus. 
While the law on resort to force and the laws of war are separate bodies of 
law with different objectives and very different histories, the relationship be, 
tween them is obviously a close one. If the use of force by a State in its interna, 
tional relations is to be lawful, it must comply with both bodies oflaw. While 
the law on resort to force is more directly the concern of decision makers at 
government level than of military commanders in the field, the latter are af, 
fected, through the medium of rules of engagement, by that law as well as by the 
law on the conduct of hostilities (the "law of war" or "law of armed conflict," 
properly so,called). 
In the last decade, both bodies of law have assumed a more prominent role 
in discussion of international affairs, and their impact on government decision 
making and on the whole military chain of command has become more impor, 
tanto The purpose of this paper is to explore that impact in the context of the 
changing nature of war and changes in the relevant rules of international law at 
the start of the new millennium. To that end, Part I of the paper will consider 
developments in the law on resort to force, such as the increased reliance on 
United Nations mandates as the justification for resort to force and the ques, 
tion of whether there is a right of humanitarian intervention. Part II will make a 
similar survey of developments in the law on the conduct of hostilities, particu, 
larly in the areas of United Nations operations, internal armed conflicts and 
the use of new technology in warfare. Finally, Part III will examine the impact 
of the law upon decision making, both at the governmental level and by mili, 
tary commanders. 
Part! 
The Legal Basis for Using Force 
P rior to 1919, international law recognized a right of States to resort to war in furtherance of national policy. The most important change in in, 
ternationallaw during the twentieth century has been the replacement of that 
right by a general rule that prohibits recourse to force in international relations, 
qualified by a small group of exceptions.2 Thus, Article 2(4) of the United Na, 
tions Charter provides that: 
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All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
Since the principal purpose of the United Nations is the maintenance of 
international peace and security,3 this provision has generally been interpreted 
as stating a ban on any threat or use of force in international relations unless 
that use or threat of force is justified by a specific exception to the general rule. 
The Charter itself expressly provides for only two exceptions: the right of 
individual or collective self,defence in the event of an armed attack, which is 
preserved by Article 51 of the Charter,4 and the use of force under the 
authority of the Security Council when the Council takes enforcement action 
under Chapter VII of the Charter. Although States and writers have from time 
to time suggested that other justifications for the use of force exist under 
customary international law and are not affected by Article 2(4) of the 
Charter-for example, a right of humanitarian intervention, of reprisals, of 
intervention to promote democracy, and intervention to protect a State's 
nationals outside its territory-all of these are disputed. Even the right of 
humanitarian intervention, which has assumed such importance in the last few 
years, still arouses considerable controversy5 (although this writer will argue 
that this right forms part of the corpus of modem international law). 
Since enforcement action by the Security Council was virtually unknown 
before 1990,6 until that date the law on resort to force was in practice defined 
by the limits which international law placed on the right of self,defence. Article 
51 of the Charter gives only a partial indication of those limits: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self,defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the 
exercise of this right of self,defence shall be immediately reported to the Security 
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as 
it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. 
Thus, although self,defence is intended to protect the State, no indication is 
given of what "the State" means for these purposes. Clearly, an act such as 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was an armed attack upon the State of Kuwait, but 
the concept of a State includes more than just territory; it also encompasses 
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population and government. Is an attack upon a State's nationals abroad, or 
upon ships flying its flag, or upon units of its armed forces (such as the U.S. 
forces in Berlin who were attacked by the bombing of the La Belle discotheque 
in 1986) an attack upon the State itself? This is a question of considerable 
importance to which international law gives only an uncertain answer, but the 
practice of those States which can do so has been to invoke the right of 
self-defence to protect their nationals and shipping and certainly to protect 
their armed forces. This approach is surely correct, for a State consists of its 
people as much as its territory, and there would be something very strange, to 
say the least, about a law which permitted the use of force to protect territory, 
no matter how remote, barren, or uninhabited, but not to protect the lives of a 
State's people when attacked outside its territory. 7 
Nor does the Charter give a definition of what is meant by "armed attack" 
(or in the French text "aggression annee"). The International Court ofJustice 
has said that the use of force constitutes an armed attack only when it reaches a 
certain level of intensity, so that a minor border incident would probably not 
qualify.8 It is clear, however, that the use of force need not be by regular forces 
but can include covert operations and terrorist attacks.9 In addition, while Ar-
ticle 51 is couched in terms which suggest that the right of self-defence may be 
exercised only once an armed attack has actually commenced, the better view, 
and one for which there is substantial support in State practice, is that there is a 
right of anticipatory self-defence when an armed attack is reasonably believed 
to be imminent. 10 
One further consideration is that, although Article 51 is silent on this point, 
the International Court of Justice has recognized that the right of self-defence 
is subject to the limitation that measures taken in self-defence must be propor-
tionate; excessive use of force by a State which has been the victim of an armed 
attack is unlawful. ll This requirement is often misunderstood. It does not 
mean that a State which has been attacked is confined to the degree of force 
used by the attacker: 
The requirement of the proportionality of the action taken in self-defence ... 
concerns the relationship between that action and its purpose, namely ... that of 
halting and repelling the attack or even, in so far as preventive self-defence is 
recognized, of preventing it from occurring. It would be mistaken, however, to 
think that there must be proportionality between the conduct constituting the 
armed attack and the opposing conduct. The action needed to halt and repulse 
the attack may well have to assume dimensions disproportionate to those of the 
attack suffered. 12 
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This is an important aspect of the right of self~defence and is indicative of one 
of the purposes which the international law on resort to force is designed to 
serve, namely, that if war cannot be prevented, the law should at least seek to 
contain it. It is this requirement, that the exercise of the right of self~defence 
should be confined to what is necessary and proportionate, which makes the 
limits of self~defence important not only in the decision to resort to force but 
also in decisions about how the subsequent hostilities should be conducted.I3 
While the right of self~defence remains the legal basis for the use of force 
which is most frequently invoked, it is no longer the only one. Since 1990, deci~ 
sions to employ force have increasingly had a United Nations element. The 
point can be illustrated by contrasting the Falklands conflict of 1982 with the 
Kuwait conflict of 1990-1991. Both conflicts commenced with the invasion by 
one State of territory of another and thus with a violation of Article 2(4) of the 
Charter. In the case of the Falklands, the British Government justified its resort 
to force in response to the Argentine attack entirely on the basis of the right of 
self~defence-United Kingdom territory had been the subject of an armed at~ 
tack and the United Kingdom claimed the right to use the degree of force nec~ 
essary to repel that attack, which meant, in that case, such force as was 
compatible with the laws of war and was necessary to retake and secure the is~ 
lands. The Security Council was only peripherally involved. The United King~ 
dom scored an important victory, in political terms, at the outset of the conflict 
in obtaining Resolution 502 (1982) which called on Argentina to withdraw 
and uttered a thinly veiled condemnation of the invasion. That resolution was 
not, however, a necessary part of the United Kingdom's legal justification for 
the military operations on which it then embarked. The legal questions were, 
first, was the United Kingdom acting within the scope of the right of self~de~ 
fence-in particular, were its actions within the proportionality require~ 
ment-and, secondly, did those actions comply with the laws of war? 
By contrast, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the Security Coun~ 
cil determined that that action was a breach of international peace and then 
took enforcement action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.14 
The United Nations could not itself undertake military action, as envisaged in 
the Charter, but it used its powers under Chapter VII to authorize military ac~ 
tion by an ad hoc coalition of States. Thus, Security Council Resolution 678 
(1990) authorized "States co~operating with the Government of Kuwait" (a 
formula carefully designed to avoid any suggestion that the Council was ap~ 
proving military action by Israel) to use force in order to ensure Iraqi compli~ 
ance with the various resolutions on Kuwait and "to restore international 
peace and security in the area." 
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The importance of that authorization was evident at both the political and 
legal levels. At the political level it helped to cement the coalition and to en, 
hance its credibility, especially in the Arab world. At the legal level, Resolution 
678 was not essential, in the sense that the coalition States could have justified 
recourse to force by reference to the right of collective self,defence in the face 
of what was undoubtedly an armed attack upon Kuwait. However, Resolution 
678 had important legal (as well as political) effects, for it provided an entirely 
new justification for using force, one derived from the Security Council au tho, 
rization. Moreover, that justification entitled the coalition States, in principle, 
to go beyond what the same States would have been entitled to do by way of 
collective self,defence.15 Self,defence would have justified only what was nee' 
essary for the liberation of Kuwait. Resolution 678, on the other hand, justified 
the use of force to restore peace and security. It is by no means clear, for exam, 
pIe, that the right of self,defence would have justified what was in effect a 
blockade of Aqaba in "neutral" Jordan, or the attacks upon Iraq's longer term 
military potential. The peace terms imposed upon Iraq in Resolution 687 
(1991) also went far beyond anything which could lawfully have been required 
by States relying uPO!\ their own rights of self,defence. 
The lesson is clear. By obtaining the backing of the Security Council for 
their use of force against Iraq, the principal coalition States not only secured a 
far firmer political base and, in particular, reinforced their support in the Arab 
world, they also obtained the authority to go beyond what even an expansive 
interpretation of the right of self,defence would have permitted in that they 
were authorized to use force to achieve objectives which would not have fallen 
within the concept of self,defence. The price was the political complication of 
having to secure the necessary support in the United Nations Security Council. 
In practice, however, that price was a small one. Having secured enough votes 
to pass Resolution 678,16 the coalition was not then subject to any practical 
control by the Security Council (although it reported to the Council on the ac, 
tions which it took) because the mandate conferred by Resolution 678 was very 
broad and could not have been altered without a further resolution which the 
United States, United Kingdom, and France could have vetoed even if there 
had otherwise been a majority for its adoption. While the Security Council pro' 
vided the authority to use force and defined the limits of that authorization, 
command and control in the ensuing operation rested entirely in the hands of 
the States which contributed the forcesP 
The power of the Security Council to authorize States to use force has been 
particularly important in a number of cases of humanitarian intervention, a 
ground for the use of force which has emerged into particular prominence in 
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recent years. In contrast to those cases, such as the Entebbe raid, in which 
States have intervened by force in the territory of other States in order to pro~ 
tect their own citizens, humanitarian intervention entails intervention in order 
to protect the nationals of the target State from their own government or, in 
some cases, from events occurring in the target State which the government of 
that State (if one still exists) is unwilling or unable to control. The use of force 
for this purpose cannot be accommodated, even within the elastic limits of the 
right of self~defence. If humanitarian intervention is to be considered lawful, 
therefore, it must be because of the existence of a legal basis for using force sep~ 
arate from the right of self~defence. 
It now appears to be widely accepted that the Security Council has the 
power to authorize intervention on humanitarian grounds. Since 1990, the Se~ 
curity Council has done so in relation to Somalia and Haiti, as well as giving 
subsequent approval to the ECOW AS operation in Liberia, while humanitar~ 
ian intervention was one of the features of the United Nations operations in 
the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995. Such actions have required the 
Security Council to take a broader view of what constitutes a threat to interna~ 
tional peace and security,18 extending it from situations involving the use of 
force between States to conflicts within a State. That was an easy step to take 
where the conflict within a State affected a neighbouring country or threat~ 
ened to spill over an international boundary (as happened in Liberia). 
In both the Somalia and Haiti cases, however, the Council acted at a time 
when the threat to other States was minimal, and it seems that it was the situa~ 
tion within those two States which was considered to be the threat to interna~ 
tional peace. In the Somalia case, the Council effectively admitted as much 
when it determined, in the Preamble to Resolution 794 (1992), that "the mag~ 
nitude of the human tragedy" within Somalia posed a threat to international 
peace and security. No mention was made of any effect upon neighbouring 
States and, in fact, at the time that that resolution was adopted, the effect upon 
neighbouring States was minimal since the fighting was contained within So~ 
malia and few Somalis were able to flee the country. In the case of Haiti, the 
flow of refugees to neighbouring States was undeniably a political problem, but 
it could not be said to have threatened the peace of the region or the security of 
any other State. 
A more difficult question is whether there are any circumstances in which it 
is lawful for a State, or group of States, to intervene by force on humanitarian 
grounds without the authorization of the Security Council. This question has, 
of course, received much attention as a result of the NATO operations over 
Kosovo which began in March 1999. 
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Prior to 1990, the legality of humanitarian intervention in the absence of 
United Nations authorization was widely questioned. Nevertheless, there were 
occasions when States invoked a right of humanitarian intervention. When In, 
dia intervened in Bangladesh in 1971, and when Vietnam invaded Cambodia 
and Tanzania Uganda in 1979, they claimed to be acting in exercise of such a 
right, although they did so only as a secondary justification and their claims met 
with considerable resistance.I9 
Since 1990, however, there has been a more substantial body of State prac, 
tice sustaining a right of intervention in a case of extreme humanitarian 
need.2o The Economic Community of West African States (ECOW AS) inter' 
vention in Liberia in 1990 could only have been justified as an exercise of a 
right of humanitarian intervention, yet not only did it meet with no condemna, 
tion from the international community, it eventually received the express en' 
dorsement of the Security Council some two years later.21 The interventions by 
United States, British, and other forces in northern Iraq in 1991 and southern 
Iraq the following year are an even more striking assertion of the right of hu, 
manitarian intervention. Although the intervention was preceded by the adop, 
tion of Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), which condemned Iraq's 
attacks upon its civilian population, that resolution was not adopted under 
Chapter VII of the Charter and did not authorize military action. The justifica, 
tion for the operation rested, therefore, on the assertion of a right of humani, 
tarian intervention under general international law. While Iraq protested at 
these incursions into its territory, they again met with almost no opposition in 
the rest of the international community. 
In asserting a right of humanitarian intervention in Yugoslavia, the NATO 
States were not, therefore, writing on an empty page. As was the case in Iraq, 
military action was not authorized by the Security Council but the Security 
Council had condemned the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's treatment of the 
population of Kosovo as a threat to international peace and security.22 More, 
over, the Security Council had expressly recognized that there was overwhelm, 
ing evidence of widespread violations of human rights and consequent loss of 
life in Kosovo (much of the evidence for which came from the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees and other impeccable sources) before NATO 
action commenced. These factors have led a number of writers to conclude 
that the NATO action was necessary and morally justified, but that it was nev, 
ertheless unlawful. 23 If true, that is a damning condemnation of international 
law. The present writer, however, does not accept that it is true. International 
law is not static and modem international law can no longer be regarded as giv, 
ing the protection of State sovereignty absolute primacy over the protection of 
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life. In this writer's opinion, a right of humanitarian intervention is part. of con-
temporary customary international law, and the rejection in the Security 
Council-by the substantial majority of twelve votes to three-of a Russian 
draft resolution which would have condemned the NATO action tends to re-
inforce that conclusion. 
Another change of considerable importance is illustrated by the earlier 
United Nations involvement in the fighting in the former Yugoslavia. For most 
of its history, the United Nations has distinguished between enforcement ac-
tion, where the Security Council either established a United Nations force to 
fight an aggressor or authorized States to conduct a war against the aggressor 
on behalf of the United Nations, and peacekeeping operations, in which the 
United Nations established a force to police a cease-fire or perform other tasks 
of an essentially neutral character. While a peacekeeping force might become 
involved in fighting, especially ifit were itself attacked, it was not intended that 
such a force should become a party to a conflict. The distinction between the 
two types of operation was rightly considered to be of the utmost importance 
(although, in practice, almost all United Nations operations were of the peace-
keeping kind). 
The revitalization of the St!curity Council in the 1990s, however, has led to 
the United Nations attempting to mount operations which had some of the at-
tributes of both peacekeeping and enforcement action. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
for example, UNPROFOR was originally established with a role which was pri-
marily one of peacekeeping,24 at least in the sense that UNPROFOR was 
charged with a humanitarian mandate, to be discharged on an impartial basis, 
and was neither intended nor equipped to fight a war. Over time, however, this 
basic mandate changed as the Security Council used its enforcement powers 
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to give UNPROFOR new 
tasks, such as monitoring (and, perhaps, protecting) the safe areas established 
by the Security Council, while NATO air forces, operating outside the United 
Nations chain of command, were authorized by the Council to use air power in 
support of specific UNPROFOR objectives. 
As the conflict progressed, some States which were major contributors to 
UNPROFOR became increasingly concerned about the safety of their contin-
gents in Bosnia-Herzegovina and deployed forces, under national not United 
Nations control, to the region to assist in protecting UNPROFOR and, if nec-
essary, in evacuating their UNPROFOR contingents. Had such an evacuation 
been attempted in, for example, the winter of 1994 against armed opposition, 
the legal authority to use force against those attacking UNPROFOR units or 
attempting to prevent their redeployment would have been derived from a 
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complex mix of the various United Nations mandates and the right of self-de-
fence of the various contributor States. Given the military and political com-
plexity of such an operation, this additional level of legal complication would 
have been far from helpful. 
Although enthusiasm in the United States for United Nations involvement 
in armed conflicts has diminished since the Somalia conflict, and the number 
of United Nations peacekeepers is unlikely to climb back to its peak of 
1994-1995 in the near future, it is also unlikely that the United Nations will re-
turn to its comparatively passive role of the 1970s and 1980s. The position of 
the Security Council in the international legal system as a body which can au-
thorize States to use force in circumstances where they could not otherwise 
lawfully do so makes it too useful for that. The other options-disregarding the 
law or attempting to develop new customary law rules permitting the use of 
force-are problematic. The first course entails abandoning the advantages 
which legitimacy bestows; the second would encounter serious opposition and 
would be very much a mixed blessing, since rules developed for the benefit of 
one State or group of States are, of course, equally available to others. 
One further development requires comment. A majority of modem conflicts 
occur within a State, or, at least, have their origins in an internal conflict, even 
if they subsequently involve other States. The law on resort to force tradition-
ally had nothing to say about internal conflicts. Rebellion did not violate inter-
national law but nor was it the exercise of a right under international law, 
except where force was used to vindicate a right to self-determination, some-
thing which until recently was assumed to be confined to colonial and 
quasi-colonial cases. Similarly, international law left the incumbent govern-
ment free to employ force against any challenge to its authority. Article 2(4) of 
the United Nations Charter prohibited the use of force by States only in their 
international relations, not in their dealings with their own peoples. Interna-
tionallaw did prohibit assistance to rebels and, once the situation in a State 
reached the level of civil war, to governments. In practice, however, the latter 
part of that rule was almost entirely disregarded and States continued to pro-
vide military assistance to governments even after those governments had lost 
control of most of the territory and population of their States. 
There has been no formal change in the law. There are, however, signs of a 
change in practice in the way that the law is interpreted and applied. First, the 
Security Council has been willing to treat the use of force within a State as giv-
ing rise to a threat to international peace and security and to take action in re-
spect of it. For example, in the early stages of the conflict in what was then still 
treated as a single Yugoslavia, the Council imposed an arms embargo in 
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Resolution 713 (1991); more recently, in Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 
(1998) and 1244 (1999), it has first imposed sanctions on the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, because of the latter's military crackdown in Kosovo, and then 
authorized the deployment there of a multinational and essentially NATO~ 
dominated force in the wake of the NATO air operations against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Secondly, the speed with which much of the international community rec~ 
ognized the new States which emerged from the former Yugoslavia and the in~ 
sistence upon non~recognition of boundary changes resulting from the use of 
force suggest that the concept of self~determination may be acquiring a broader 
meaning than hitherto. 
Thirdly, there are indications that the use of force by an incumbent govern~ 
ment may, in certain circumstances, be regarded as unlawful, for example if it 
involves the use of federal troops against a breakaway province (as in Yugosla~ 
via in 1991) or against an entity which has carved out some kind of de facto in~ 
ternational status (such as Taiwan). These are tentative steps. The fighting in 
Chechnya and Sri Lanka, for example, has not attracted the same degree of at~ 
tention. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that international law in the next cen~ 
tury will continue to ignore the use of force within a State in the way that it has 
for most of the twentieth century. 
Partll 
Law and the Conduct of Hostilities 
W hile the law on resort to force seeks to prevent, or at least to contain war, the principal goal of the laws of war today is the preservation of 
certain humanitarian values in war, particularly by limiting violence against 
those who do not take a direct part in hostilities. This emphasis on humanitar~ 
ian values helps to explain one of the apparently paradoxical aspects of the laws 
of war-the fact that they apply with equal force to both sides in a conflict, irre~ 
spective of which is the aggressor and which the victim.25 
In contrast to the law on resort to force, which consists almost entirely of 
broad principles with considerable flexibility, the laws of war are de~ 
tailed-more than thirty treaties, running in total to several hundred 
pages-and, in most respects, very precise. While the most detailed regimes 
concern the treatment of persons who are clearly not participating in hostili~ 
ties-the wounded, sick, shipwrecked, prisoners of war, and civilian detainees 
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and the civilian population of occupied territory-recent years have seen an 
increased emphasis on what may be termed "front line law," that law dealing 
with the actual conduct of combat operations. This law requires, inter alia, that 
the armed forces distinguish at all times between combatants and civilians, di, 
rect attacks only against the military and military objectives 26 and not against 
civilians or civilian objects, and refrain from attacking a military objective 
when it is likely that to do so would cause collateral civilian loss and damage 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advan, 
tage anticipated from the attackP It is evident that principles of this kind, if 
properly observed, have a significant impact on the way in which the military 
conduct operations, which is quite different from, e.g., the requirement of hu, 
mane treatment of prisoners of war. 
This paper cannot review the whole of the laws of war, and even a brief sur, 
vey of the treaties and other developments of the last decade would exceed 
what is possible here.28 Instead, this part of the paper will examine certain is, 
sues likely to prove particularly important in the wars of the future. 
The Scope of Application of the Laws of War. One of the most difficult 
questions raised by the laws of war is when those laws apply. Declarations of 
war are today almost unknown and the laws of war are no longer confined to 
the handful of cases-such as the Arab, Israel conflict-in which a formal state 
of war may be said to exist.29 It is common ground that the laws of war today 
apply to any armed conflict between two or more States, whether or not the 
belligerents recognize that they are at war.30 Moreover, there has been a 
tendency to give the concept of armed conflict a very broad definition. The 
United States, for example, maintained that when Syrian anti,aircraft batteries 
in the Bekaa Valley shot down a United States Navy plane and captured its 
pilot, that incident gave rise to an armed conflict and the pilot was accordingly 
entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war. The U.S. note to Syria added that the 
conflict had ended after only a few hours and Syria was therefore under a duty 
to return the pilot.31 This interpretation of "armed conflict" is, perhaps, 
somewhat elastic, but the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and the International Committee of the Red Cross have both 
treated the concept as broad enough to cover any fighting between two or more 
States, even if the scale of the fighting is small and the duration brief.32 In this 
respect, the popular use of terms such as "Operations Other Than War" tends 
to mislead, since military operations by one State against another become 
subject to the laws of war as soon as they result in the use of force between the 
190 
Christopher Greenwood 
States concerned, irrespective of the term which may have been used to 
describe such operations. 
Thus, there is no doubt that the recent air operations by the NATO States 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over the latter's atrocities in Kosovo 
constituted an international armed conflict between the NATO States and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The fact that the NATO States' motives were 
humanitarian and the operation was conducted for strictly limited goals does 
not alter the fact that there was an armed conflict to which the Geneva Con, 
ventions and the whole corpus of the laws of armed conflict applied.33 
Non,Intemational Anned Conflicts. Although the laws of war never wholly 
ignored conflicts within a State, their rules were primarily designed for 
international conflicts. Not until 1949 did the international community adopt 
a treaty provision specifically concerning internal armed conflicts. Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions was undeniably a major step, but it did 
little more than require the parties (government and insurgent) to a conflict to 
observe a few minimum humanitarian standards in their treatment of the 
wounded, prisoners, and civilians who took no part in hostilities. In 1977, 
Additional Protocol II added considerably to the law on this subject but only in 
the case of conflicts in which the insurgents actually controlled part of the 
territory of the State. Even then, the provisions of the Protocol were far less 
extensive, particularly in relation to the actual conduct of military operations, 
than were the comparable provisions of the law on international conflicts. 
In the last few years, however, there has been a dramatic change in the law. 
Most of the recent treaties on weapons-the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
1993, the Land Mines Convention, 1997, and the amended Land Mines and 
Booby Traps Protocol to the United Nations Conventional Weapons Conven, 
tion-are applicable to internal as well as international conflicts. Even more 
important are the developments in customary law. The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has held that the customary law applicable 
to the conduct of armed conflicts within a State is far more extensive than had 
generally been thought.34 In relation to such matters as the targeting of civil, 
ians and the precautionary measures which should be taken to protect them, it 
is clear that the Tribunal, whose decisions are likely to have considerable influ, 
ence, considers that the customary law on internal conflicts is now essentially 
the same as that for international conflicts. It has also held that violations of 
the law applicable in internal conflicts constitute war crimes. The Tribunal's 
ruling on this point has now been partially reflected in the list of war crimes in' 
cluded in Article 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted 
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in 1998, which confers upon the Court jurisdiction in respect of certain crimes 
committed in non~international armed conflicts. 
Nevertheless, it remains important to determine the borderline between in~ 
ternal and international conflicts and, in particular, to know at what point the 
involvement of outside forces has the effect ofinternationalizing a conflict and 
subjecting it to the full body of the laws of war. Unfortunately, international 
law gives no clear answer to that question. As a matter oflaw, the laws of war 
apply only where the armed forces of one State meet those of another. Accord~ 
ingly, if outside forces intervene in a civil war to assist the government of a 
State against rebel forces, the resulting conflict continues to be a civil war and 
to be subject only to the smaller body of law applicable to such conflicts. This 
principle has been strictly applied by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia.35 There is something deeply unsatisfactory about this 
uncertainty. At the very least, where the forces of State A become involved in 
fighting in State B, they should be subject to the laws of war in their entirety, 
even if their local allies are not. 
United Nations Operations. The growth in the number and variety of United 
Nations military operations since 1990 has already been discussed in Part 1. 
This development has highlighted the fact that there exists considerable 
uncertainty regarding the applicability of the laws of war to the operations of 
United Nations forces.36 This is not a problem when a United Nations force, or 
a force authorized by the United Nations, is sent out to fight a war, since it is 
agreed that the laws of war would apply in full to hostilities between such a 
force and the forces of a State. Nor should it be a problem where a United 
Nations force operates in a traditional peacekeeping mode, since such a force 
would remain impartial and not become a party to an armed conflict of any 
kind. As shown in Part I, however, some recent United Nations operations 
have had both peacekeeping and enforcement elements. Moreover, in a 
number of cases, forces with a pure peacekeeping mandate have been drawn 
into fighting (usually by attacks upon their personnel which have caused them 
to exercise their right of self~defence).37 In such cases, it is far from clear 
whether the laws of war are applicable to the activities of the United Nations 
forces concerned. 
The United Nations has accepted that, as a minimum, its forces are obliged 
to comply with the "principles and spirit" of the laws of armed conflict. As a 
matter of principle, however, in cases where a United Nations force becomes 
involved in fighting to such an extent that it is a party to an armed conflict, it 
should comply not merely with the principles and spirit, but with the entirety of 
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the law. That much appears to be taken for granted in the provisions of the re~ 
cently adopted Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel, 1994. The Convention makes attacks on United Nations personnel 
an offence, but Article 2(2) provides that: 
This Convention shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorised by the 
Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations in which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants 
against organized armed forces and to which the law of international armed conflict 
applies. (Emphasis added.) 
The problem is that there is no agreement as to when the line identified in this 
provision is crossed. The scale of the fighting in which UNPROFOR and 
supporting forces became involved in Bosnia would unquestionably be 
sufficient to cross the very low threshold of armed conflict identified earlier in 
this paper,38 but it appears that the 1994 Convention was drafted on the 
assumption that the additional protection which it affords to United Nations 
personnel would have been applicable in Yugoslavia. This problem is one 
which is likely to recur and to cause real difficulty in the future, since the 
threshold for the application of the laws of war has now also become the ceiling 
for the application of the 1994 Convention. 
Moreover, even if a particular United Nations operation is not subject to the 
laws of war, it does not take place in a legal vacuum. The United Nations, no 
less than its Member States, is a subject of international law and is bound by 
customary international law. Concern about the behaviour of what was admit~ 
tedly a very small minority of United Nations troops in Somalia and certain 
other operations has led to calls for a clearer identification of the legal stan~ 
dards with which members of United Nations forces must comply. That has led 
the United Nations, after consultations with the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, to draw up a set of Draft Directives for the conduct of peace~ 
keepers, drawn from the laws of war. It is arguable that at least some of the pro~ 
visions of human rights law are also applicable to United Nations 
peacekeepers, either because of the adherence of Member States to human 
rights treaties or because those provisions have become part of customary in~ 
ternationallaw. 
The problem is that there remains far too great a degree of uncertainty on 
this subject. To be effective in a military context, the law must be clear and 
must not be so complex that it is incapable of practical application. The law on 
United Nations operations does not yet meet those requirements, and its 
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clarification and, perhaps, reform, ought to be treated as a far more urgent pri, 
ority than it has been so far. . 
The Laws of War and New Technology. Much of the law of war can be traced 
back to the beginning of the twentieth century (even further in the case of the 
law of naval warfare). Can such law be applied to the very different technology 
of warfare which exists today and which was so dramatically demonstrated in 
the Kuwait conflict? Some parts of the law are clearly ill,suited to modem 
conditions. The law of naval warfare still emphasises the right of visit and 
search at sea despite the fact that this practice is almost impossible to conduct 
in an age of comparatively small surface fleets and containerised shipping 
(which cannot be searched at sea, since it is usually impossible to gain access to 
the containers). This is an area of the law which would benefit at the very least 
from clarification of what is a legitimate target-the Iran,Iraq War having 
demonstrated the very considerable differences of opinion which existed on 
that subject even between the United States and other NATO countries.39 At 
present, however, it seems unlikely that there is sufficient political support for 
any such move. 
In other areas, the picture is better. The Kuwait conflict showed that the 
principles of customary international law regarding the distinction between ci, 
vilian objects and military targets and the principle of proportionality-i.e., 
that even a military target should not be attacked if to do so would cause civil, 
ian casualties which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated-remain capable of application, although the 
proportionality principle requires a measure of fresh thought, given that the 
collateral casualties in Iraq tended to come not from the direct effects of the 
bombing but rather the damage to infrastructure such as the power system 
which in tum led to a breakdown of sanitation and medical facilities with con, 
sequent severe effects on the civilian population. 
The principles of the law in relation to the conduct of hostilities can gener, 
ally be adapted to new methods of waging war, precisely because those princi, 
pIes are so general in character. The International Court of Justice had no 
difficulty in holding them applicable to the possible use of nuclear weapons in 
its recent opinion.40 Suppose that it became possible for a State to cause havoc 
to an enemy through the application of electronic measures or the selective 
planting of computer viruses which brought to a standstill whole computer sys, 
terns and the infrastructure which depended upon them. Such a method of 
warfare would appear to be wholly outside the scope of the existing law. Yet 
that is not really so. The application of those measures is still likely to affect the 
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civilian population and possibly to cause great damage and even loss of life 
amongst that population. As such, it should be subject to the same principles of 
distinction and proportionality considered above and there is no compelling 
reason why its legality cannot be assessed by reference to these principles, not-
withstanding that the principles were devised in the context of attacks carried 
out with weapons of a wholly different kind. 
Part ill 
The Impact of the Law on Decision,Making 
W hat impact, then, do these rules of international law have upon deci-sions regarding the use of force? To the "realist" school of interna-
tional relations, the answer is "none." For them, international law is no more 
than "the advocate's mantle artfully draped across the shoulders of arbitrary 
power." Theirs, however, is a "realism" far removed from the reality of the way 
in which most governments conduct international relations. Governments do 
not, for the most part, employ legal advisers merely to provide an apologia for 
decisions already taken on policy grounds, but because legal considerations are 
one of the factors which have to be taken into account in the process of deci-
sion, particularly where the question for decision is whether, or how, to use 
force in order to achieve a particular goal. While it would be naIve to imagine 
that legal considerations are invariably the controlling factor, it is equally unre-
alistic to assume that they have no influence at all. 
Indeed, even if the cynical view were correct, and the role of the lawyer is no 
more than to drape a mantle over the projection of power, law would retain a 
degree of significance. Such a mantle is employed only because most States are 
concerned at least to appear to be acting within the law. It is, therefore, of some 
importance to States that the mantle is not threadbare-as it was with at least 
some of the arguments advanced by the United States to justify its 1989 inter-
vention in Panama-still less manifestly illusory, as was the case with the 
USSR's attempts to justify its intervention in Afghanistan a decade earlier or 
the British Government's arguments over the Suez intervention in 1956. 
That is particularly so when the use of force has any kind of multilateral 
character and especially where the decision to use, or at least to authorise the 
use of, force is taken within the United Nations or another international orga-
nization. To obtain the authorization of the Security Council for military oper-
ations, a State must be able to deploy a plausible case that there is a threat to 
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international peace and security within the meaning of Article 39 of the 
United Nations Charter, so that the Security Council has the legal power to 
act, and that the use of force of the degree and kind proposed is a legitimate 
method of addressing that threat. Othenvise, it will not be able to secure the 
support needed to obtain a mandate from the Security Council. 
The legal basis for resorting to force has an important impact both at the 
strategic level of decision making and, through the medium of rules of engage~ 
ment, at lower levels of command. We have already seen that the existence of a 
Security Council mandate can affect the purpose for which force may be used 
and, therefore, the degree of force which may be employed. In the case of the 
Kuwait conflict, the existence of a Security Council mandate enlarged the 
scope of the Coalition's right to use force beyond what would have been per~ 
mitted in self~defence. A mandate which is drawn more narrowly than that in 
Resolution 678 may, however, have an important limiting effect. In the opera~ 
tions in Bosnia~Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995, the mandate given to 
UNPROFOR and the secondary mandate conferred upon NATO to use air 
power in support ofUNPROFOR were limited both as to ends and means. To 
take just a few examples: 
• The authorization given by the Security Council to NATO to use air 
power to enforce the ban on military flights over Bosnia~ Herzegovina was 
for a long time limited to the air space of Bosnia itself, so that, for a 
considerable time, NATO was not authorized to use force against Serb air 
bases in the Serb~held parts of Croatia, even though these were being 
used for air operations over Bosnia. 
• It was unclear to what extent the mandate permitted the use of air power 
to protect the "safe areas" in Bosnia, nominated by the Security Council, 
although the real problem here lay less in the clarity of the mandate than 
in the ill~thought~out nature of the "safe areas" and the lack of willingness 
to defend them in 1995. 
• When agreements restricting the use of heavy weapons in certain parts of 
Bosnia were concluded under the auspices of the UNPROFOR com~ 
mander in 1994, it is unclear to what extent, if at all, either UNPROFOR 
or NATO was empowered to use force in response to violations of those 
agreements. 
It is clear that these issues had an effect upon the rules of engagement issued 
to UNPROFOR and NATO forces and that, in some respects, they were more 
restrictive of NATO action than would have been the case had NATO relied 
not upon a Security Council mandate but upon collective self~defence.41 It 
should, however, be realized that the proportionality principle in self~defence 
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(which was discussed in Part II) also has an effect upon the freedom of action of a 
force affecting for example, such questions as the degree of force which may be 
used and the area within which it is legitimate to take military action. For exam~ 
pIe, insofar as there are grounds for questioning the legality of the British action 
in sinking the General Belgrano during the Falklands Conflict in 1982, that is 
not because the sinking occurred outside the exclusion zone which the United 
Kingdom had proclaimed around the Islands,42 but because it can be argued 
that the sinking of the cruiser was not a necessary step in retaking the Islands.43 
The laws of war also have a significant impact on command decisions, again 
through the medium of rules of engagement, if these are properly drawn. While 
much of the laws of war relates to matters taking place behind the combat 
zone-e.g., the treatment of prisoners of war-the need to comply with these 
rules has implications for the conduct of the commander, as the problems in 
handling the large numbers of prisoners taken in the Falklands and the Kuwait 
conflict demonstrate. In the case of the rules prohibiting attacks on civilians 
and requiring commanders to observe the principle of proportionality, the im~ 
pact is even more apparent. For example, Article 57 of Additional Protocol I 
requires those who plan or decide upon an attack to take all practicable steps to 
ensure: 
(a) that the target to be attacked is a legitimate military objective; 
(b) that it can be attacked without causing collateral civilian losses or damage to 
civilian objects which is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated from the attack; 
(c) that the methods and means of attack are selected with a view to minimising 
the collateral losses and damage; and 
(d) that the attack is called off if it becomes clear that these tests will not in fact 
be met. 
Properly drafted rules of engagement will take account of all these legal con~ 
straints, although it has to be remembered that they are by no means the only 
constraints which will feature in ROE, which will also restrict the commander's 
freedom of action in response to military and political factors. The impact of 
the law should also be enhanced by its role in military education and training. 
Moreover, the recent decision to establish an International Criminal Court is 
likely to increase awareness of the laws of war and to lead to greater press and 
public scrutiny of military operations. 
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If F ONE TAKES STOCK OF THE PART which international law has played in 11 military operations and the influence which it has today, the picture which 
emerges is distinctly mixed. Much of the century which is just ending has been 
a catalogue of violations with a total disregard for the law. Yet the century has 
also seen unprecedented development of the law itself, with the adoption of an 
extensive body of treaty law and the development of important rules of custom, 
ary law. At least in the democracies, that law is taken a great deal more seri, 
ously by governments and the military than were the far less detailed rules 
which existed at the start of the century. 
There is an enormous temptation to assume that where the law is not work, 
ing today, the answer is that we need more and better law. International law on 
military operations will, of course, continue to develop; however, the priority 
should be not to legislate but to ensure greater respect for the law that already 
exists. In the military context, that means more than the prosecution of offend, 
ers-it requires the development of a culture of compliance with the law. That 
in tum requires that the practical effects of the law on military operations be 
properly understood. It is for that goal that Leslie Green has worked so tirelessly 
for more than fifty years and which makes the publication of this volume in his 
honour so appropriate. 
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